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Abstract: 
The costs and consequences of ethnic diversity in Africa have been widely noted.  However, despite 
Africa’s high level of ethnic diversity and its large internal variation, the sources of this diversity 
remain unexplained.  Here we show that ethnic diversity in Africa is a result of its tropical location, 
the pre-colonial slave trade, the colonial creation of large states and low levels of urbanization.  The 
effect of these variables are robust to various controls and specifications.  We also show that, once 
pre-colonial slavery is introduced, an African dummy variable becomes insignificant in regressions 
containing a world-wide sample of countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent years Sub-Saharan Africa’s ethnic diversity has become almost synonymous for 
the continent’s economic and political problems.  Scholars have argued that ethnic diversity has 
been responsible for Africa’s low economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997; Posner 2004a), 
political instability and conflict (Buhaug 2006; Easterly 2001), high inequality (Barr and Oduro 
2002; Milanovic 2003) and low provision of public goods (Kimenyi 2006; Miguel and Gugerty 
2005). 1  What remains unexplained, however, are the origins of Africa’s ethnic diversity. 
In particular what makes Africa particularly interesting in this regard is both its unusually 
high levels and large internal variation in ethnic diversity.  As regards the former, previous attempts 
to explain global ethnic diversity still find an Africa dummy variable to be statistically significant 
(Ahlerup and Olsson 2009; Michalopoulos 2008).  As regards the latter, Africa’s standard deviation 
in the number of ethnic groups per country is more than 35% higher than any other region 
according to one recent dataset on ethnic diversity (Fearon 2003, 204).2  Moreover, as seen in Table 
1, another recent dataset from Alesina, Devleeshauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) 
shows that the standard deviation in ethnic diversity per country as measured by the Ethno-
Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index is similarly largest in Africa,3 which also contains the 
countries with the smallest and largest measures of ethnic diversity in the world.  Indeed, in a 
continent with high levels of diversity in such countries as Liberia and Uganda it is striking to find 
largely homogenous countries like Burundi and Comoros. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                               
1
 Here and henceforth we refer to Sub-Saharan Africa merely as Africa. 
2
 The next highest region is Asia. 
3
 The ELF index is computed by summing the squares of all ethnic groups larger than 1% of the 
population and subtracting them from 1. 
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 In this paper we therefore probe the origins of African ethnic diversity.  We show that ethnic 
diversity within Africa is a result of its low latitudes, the pre-colonial slave trade, the creation of 
large colonial states and low levels of urbanization.  More specifically, we demonstrate that a 
variable capturing the number of slaves exported per country between 1400 and 1900 eliminates the 
statistical significance of an Africa dummy variable in regressions containing a world-wide sample 
of countries.  We also show that low population densities led colonialists to create large states, 
thereby leading to higher levels of ethnic diversity within Africa.  Finally, we use a lagged measure 
of urbanization to demonstrate that urbanization is correlated with ethnic homogenization over time.  
The paper thus suggests that African ethnic diversity has pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
roots and is continuing to change. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  First, we examine a variety of theories for the origins of 
African ethnic diversity.  Second, we test these theories in a series of multivariate regressions, 
finding that low latitude, the slave trade and state size are consistently associated with higher levels 
of diversity.  Third, we perform additional tests on change in ethnic identity over time, confirming 
the role of urbanization in the late 20th century.  Finally we conclude with wider thoughts on 
African ethnic diversity. 
 
2. AFRICAN ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 The vast majority of political economy work on Africa takes ethnicity as fixed and thus uses 
it as an independent variable rather than a dependent variable.4  This phenomenon has continued to 
occur despite the fact that anthropologists began to move away from a “primordial” understanding 
of ethnicity towards a more “constructivist” point of view in the late 1960s (Barth 1969; Cohen 
1969).  Indeed, of late political scientists and sociologists have continued to emphasize the 
                                               
4
 See for instance Easterly and Levine (1997) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005), among many others. 
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dynamism of ethnicity (Brubaker 2004; Chandra 2006), although it is too early to say whether these 
scholars have made a major impact on the field. 
 One strong conclusion that has come out of the constructivist literature is that modern 
processes of economic and political development have profoundly shaped ethnic identities.  Gellner 
(2006 [1983]), for instance, proposed that industrialization can have a strong impact on the 
formation of cross-ethnic national identities, while the colonial state has been acknowledged to have 
had a major impact on shaping modern ethnic identities in Africa (Laitin 1994; Posner 2003).  We 
thus focus our attention here on a variety of potential causes of African ethnic diversity, first 
beginning with pre-colonial and colonial origins in the rest of section 2 before moving onto post-
colonial sources in section 3. 
 
2.1. Pre-Colonial and Colonial Origins 
 
There are several already existing hypotheses about the origins of Africa’s pre-colonial 
ethnic diversity.  Several of these are geographic in nature: for instance, many scholars have 
suggested that latitude and/or temperature has an inverse relationship with ethnic diversity, in that 
warm tropical environments are ideal for growing food and thereby create few incentives for 
inhabitants to migrate  elsewhere or trade extensively with other human populations.  This isolation 
thus spurs the creation of new ethnic groups in very much the same way as Darwin had proposed 
for finch species in the Galapagos islands (Ahlerup and Olsson 2009; Cashdan 2001; Collard and 
Foley 2002; Nichols 1992; Sutherland 2003).  Other researchers have found a significant positive 
correlation between elevation and ethnic diversity (Nichols 1992; Sutherland 2003), which 
presumably works along the same mechanisms of encouraging isolation among human populations. 
An alternative hypothesis for the pre-colonial era is the slave trade: as argued by Nunn 
(2008), the slave trade may have weakened ties between Africans and thereby inhibited the 
development of broader ethnic identities.  Empirically there is a good deal of evidence supporting a 
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relationship between slavery and ethnic diversity: Nunn (2008, 164), for instance, shows a 
significant and strong correlation between slave exports per area and contemporary ethnic 
fractionalization.  The names of many African ethnic groups also suggest a link, such as the Dioula 
of West Africa, whose name comes from the Manding word gyo-la, or “the land of the slaves 
captured through warfare,” while the name of their neighbours the Gio possibly comes from the 
Bassa phrase gii-o, or “slave people” (Holsoe and Lauer 1976, 141-142).  Moreover, this evidence 
is not limited to West Africa: data from 1856 on freed slaves in what is now north-west 
Mozambique lists at least 21 different ethnic backgrounds (Isaacman 1972, 447), while the current 
Bantu ethnic minority in southern Somalia originated as slaves from southern Africa who were 
shipped along the East African coast in the 19th century by Zanzibari traders (Webersik 2004, 525-
526). 
 Moving closer to the present, scholars have long argued that the colonial period had a 
profound effect on ethnicity in Africa, for a variety of reasons.  In particular the literature suggests 
that colonialists directly promoted ethnic diversity through “divide and rule” tactics (Berman 1998; 
Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001) and indirectly by providing “tribal” chiefs and missionaries with 
the incentives to promote ethnic differences (Laitin 1994).  Scholarship on the colonial period has 
also repeatedly emphasized the way colonies were governed according to cost-saving methods.  
Indeed, at the time of its colonization Africa was relatively peripheral to European economic 
interests (Young 1994, 84-85), and the principle of colonial self-sufficiency meant that colonies had 
to pay for themselves, no matter how oddly shaped or small they were. 
The consequences of colonial cost-saving on African ethnic diversity were threefold.  First, 
European efforts at creating economies of scale and minimizing bureaucratic costs led to the 
creation of large states (Green 2012).  For instance, the average British district commissioner was 
responsible for an area the size of Wales (Herbst 2000, 78), while French colonial administrators 
created unusually large colonies in the more under-populated areas of Central and West Africa.  The 
result has been that the median former colony in Africa is 37% and 74% larger than the median 
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former colony in Latin America and the Caribbean or Asia, respectively (Green 2012).5  When we 
recall that ethnic groups in Africa are different from caste groups in India or racial groups in the US 
in the way they tend to be regionally concentrated, it is thus no surprise to find that smaller African 
states like Burundi, Djibouti and Lesotho have lower levels of ethnic diversity than Chad, the DRC 
or Tanzania.6 
A second consequence of colonial cost-saving was the drawing of arbitrary colonial borders.  
More specifically, due to the costs involved in drawing accurate borders that reflected local political 
economies, Europeans inadvertently “split up ethnic groups and exacerbated pre-existing high 
levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity” when dividing up the continent (Easterly and Levine 1997, 
1213).  In particular Englebert, Tarango, and Carter (2002, 1096) have noted that some 44% of 
colonial borders were straight lines, leading to as many as 177 ethnic groups split across two and 
sometimes three colonial borders; when added together these partitioned ethnic groups represented 
43% of the average African state’s population.  Indeed, the supposed arbitrariness of these borders 
has led some social scientists like Miguel (2004) and Posner (2004b) to use them as “natural” 
experiments inasmuch as they were supposedly drawn exogenous to pre-existing local political 
conditions.7 
A third consequence of colonial cost-saving was the creation of supposedly homogenous 
rural “tribal” areas with their own “tribal” chiefs as “decentralized despots” (Mamdani 1996).  
Labelled as “indirect rule,” this policy led in areas to the creation of new ethnic identities as 
colonialists split up Africans into separate tribal areas with their own tribal chiefdoms, thereby 
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 These comparisons exclude island states; when they are included the differences are even more 
stark. 
6
 It is thus also not surprising that Michalopoulos (2008) finds no correlation between state size and 
ethnic diversity on a global scale, as also seen below. 
7
 However, Green (2012) shows that, far from arbitrary, the artificial shape of many colonial 
borders were instead a result of low pre-colonial population densities. 
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encouraging separation and ethnic difference.  Moreover, the way in which colonial rule restricted 
both migration between tribal areas and property rights to “natives” from each area only helped to 
encourage isolation and further fractionalization. 
 
2.2. Empirical Analysis 
 
Our goal is thus to regress ethnic diversity on these aforementioned variables.  As already 
noted there exists two recently compiled datasets on global ethnic diversity, namely Alesina et al. 
(2003) and Fearon (2003).  What makes these dataset different from previous codings of ethnic 
diversity is its focus on ethnic rather than ethnolinguistic diversity, whereby groups in Rwanda and 
Somalia who speak the same language but are ethnically distinct are coded as such.  Thus we 
deliberately do not employ other datasets that explicitly use language as a proxy for ethnicity such 
as Roeder (2001) and Taylor and Hudson (1972).8  We utilize both of these new datasets here 
inasmuch as they both have advantages and disadvantages: in particular, Alesina et al. (2003) has a 
wider coverage of countries but is slightly less accurate in certain cases than Fearon (2003), such as 
with Tanzania.9 
To summarize our hypotheses, we have listed seven historic variables here which are 
hypothesized to have effects on ethnic diversity in Africa: for the pre-colonial period we have 
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 Another recent dataset was compiled by Annett (2001); as it is based on older sources and 
contains fewer observations than Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003) we do not use it here.  
Nonetheless all of the results presented here are robust to the use of Annett (2001)’s data as well. 
9
 More specifically, countries such as Tanzania and Togo do not have their ethnic identity labels 
listed in the dataset, a problem which does not occur with Fearon (2003)’s data.  As a possible result 
of these miscoding problems, Alesina et al. (2003) list Tanzania’s ethnic diversity score as only 
0.735, far below both Fearon (2003)’s score of 0.95 and the 1967 Tanzanian census’s score of 0.96 
(Government of Tanzania 1969).  (The 1967 census was the last to measure ethnicity in Tanzania.) 
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elevation, latitude, temperature and slave exports and for the colonial period we listed state size, 
artificial borders and indirect rule.  Several variables present no problems in measurement, with 
uncontroversial data available for elevation, latitude, temperature and state size.10   Other data, 
however, present certain problems.  Nunn (2008), for instance, uses current ethnic group identities 
to code historical slave exports, which he then claims led to the creation of modern ethnic groups, a 
problem which has been already criticized elsewhere (Austin 2008).  The other problem with this 
data is that it measures slaves per area that were exported from Africa, thereby excluding the 
majority of African slaves who never left the continent (Lovejoy 2000).  However, we use his data 
here as it is so far the only such cross-national data on slave exports. 
Artificial borders could be estimated according to Englebert et al. (2002)’s estimates on the 
number of straight and non-straight borders in Africa.  However, more recently and finally, we 
utilize a new “fractal” measure of artificial borders by Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011) 
which captures the degree to which a country’s land borders are one or two dimensional.  Thus 
African countries range from the straight-line borders of Somalia (fractal = 0.003) and Equatorial 
Guinea (0.007) to the curved and jagged borders of Sierra Leone (0.055) and Rwanda (0.072). 
Finally, measuring indirect rule is also problematic since the sole available measure is one 
created by Lange (2004) for British colonies, leaving us with only 14 observations and a non-
representative sample.11  Another alternative is to use colonial identity as a proxy for indirect rule, 
inasmuch as there is some evidence that the British were more forthright in using indirect rule than 
the French in their African colonies (Blanton et al. 2001; Grier 1999).  We thus introduce colonial 
dummies for the three main colonial powers of France, Portugal and the UK. 
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 For all data sources see Appendix 1. 
11
 Interestingly, regressing both ELF measures on indirect rule results in a negative relationship 
(which is not statistically significant using Fearon’s data but significant at p = 0.081 with Alesina’s 
data), suggesting that, if anything, indirect rule promoted ethnic homogenization rather than 
fractionalization. 
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We begin our analysis by testing various historical variables against each other.  Columns 1-
3 employ Alesina et al. (2003) as the dependent variable while columns 4-6 employ Fearon (2003).  
Inasmuch as elevation and temperature are highly correlated (r = -0.72) with each other for obvious 
reasons, we include them in separate regressions.  We also report the results with the fractal 
variable separately in columns 3 and 6 as Alesina et al. (2011) do not compute their data for every 
African country. 
Nonetheless, as reported in Table 2, we find a series of consistent results.  First, absolute 
latitude is correlated with ethnic diversity across all six specifications while elevation, temperature 
and the colonial dummy variables are never significant.  Second, slave exports are always positively 
and significantly correlated with ethnic diversity, with a consistent coefficient around 0.02, as is 
state size with a coefficient between 0.04 and 0.05.  Moreover, in all six regressions we explain a 
majority of the variation in ethnic diversity across Africa. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 To examine whether these variables explain the Africa dummy variable we can thus regress 
Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003) on a series of variables on a global scale.  However, Nunn 
(2008)’s data on slavery was only calculated for Sub-Saharan and North Africa.  We can 
supplement this data by examining non-African countries where evidence exists that they exported 
slaves in commercial exchanges between 1400 and 1900.12  While by no means as well documented 
as the Atlantic slave trade, recent scholarship has begun to estimate the number of slaves involved 
and their origin in the early modern Indian Ocean, Central Asian and Crimean slave trades.  As in 
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 We do not include data on slaves captured through warfare as it does not represent any 
commercial exchange, as for examples with Indian soldiers enslaved in 1647 after a failed siege in 
Afghanistan (Levi 2002, 280). 
 10 
Nunn (2008) we normalize the export figures by take the natural log of the total number of exports 
divided by the size of the country (and multiplied by 1000). 
Our new data, summarized in Appendix 2, shows that Africa was by no means the only part 
of the world to export significant numbers of slaves in the early modern period.  For instance, 
evidence suggests that the slave trade in the Indian Ocean not only exported slaves from east Africa 
but also from the Coromandel coast in south India and the Arakan/Bengal coast in what is now 
Bangladesh and Myanmar (Carter 2006; Vink 2003).  Moreover, there is evidence of Portuguese 
slave traders exporting slaves from India, Indonesia and Malaysia to Manila in the late 16th and 
early 17th centuries (Seijas 2008, 22-23), while Warren (2007, xxxv) estimates that around 300,000 
slaves from Indonesia and the Philippines were exported to the Sulu Sultanate (in what is now 
south-west Philippines) between 1768 and 1878. 
As for the Central Asian slave trade, the expansion of the Mughal Empire in the 16th and 
17th centuries resulted in “the enslavement and exportation of hundreds of thousands of individuals” 
from what is now India and Pakistan (Levi 2002, 283-284), which we estimate here as around 
300,000 people.  Given a ratio of 2:1 of Indo-Pakistani slaves to Afghan slaves in late 16th-century 
Samarkand (Levi 2002, 284), we also estimate that roughly 150,000 Afghans were subjected to the 
Central Asian slave trade.13  Finally, an estimate that half of the population of Khanata of Khiva 
was comprised of Persian slaves in 1851 suggests that Iran exported a minimum of 350,000 slaves 
during this period (Hopkins 2008, 645).  To compare these figures with Nunn (2008)’s African data 
suggests that slave exports from Afghanistan were roughly proportional to the number of exports 
from Congo-Brazzaville while Iran was more comparable to Madagascar and India/Pakistan to 
Ethiopia. 
But perhaps the most striking numbers come from Kizilov (2007, p. 7), who suggests that 
there were roughly 2 million slaves exported from nine countries in Eastern Europe through the 
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 The results below are robust to a variety of higher and lower estimates for Afghanistan, India and 
Pakistan. 
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Crimean Slave trade between 1500 and 1700.  Indeed, one source discusses the negative political 
and demographic effects of slavery in early modern Georgia in much the same way as it is often 
discussed Africa: 
 
The constant feudal warfare and the miserable life of the serfs on the individual estates 
served the interests of the slave traders so well that the population of the entire region was 
greatly reduced by the eighteenth century to the benefit of the rival Safavid and Ottoman 
states (Kortepeter 1966, 105). 
 
With this new data we can thus estimate the effect of slavery on contemporary measures of 
ethnic diversity on a global scale and observe whether it has any effect on the Africa dummy 
variable.14  Table 3 presents our results, again using both datasets as dependent variables.  We first 
start out in columns 1 and 3 by regressing ELF on a set of variables already demonstrated by 
Ahlerup and Olsson (2009) and Michalopoulos (2008) as correlating with global ethnic diversity, 
namely elevation, latitude, state size and dummies for British, French and Spanish colonial rule.  
We include an African dummy as well as a Europe dummy inasmuch as these are the only two 
continent dummy variables that are significantly correlated with ELF in univariate regressions.  In 
both regressions both latitude and the Africa dummy are highly significant in the expected 
directions. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
In columns 2 and 4, however, we introduce the updated slavery variable, which is not only 
highly statistically significant but also entirely removes the significance of the Africa dummy.  
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 This exercise is thus similar to Englebert (2000)’s efforts in eliminating the statistical significance 
of the Africa dummy in a series of growth regressions.  Interestingly Englebert (2000)’s newly 
created “legit” variable does not eliminate the effect of the Africa dummy when regressing ethnic 
diversity instead of growth. 
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Interestingly the slavery variable has no significant effect on any other variable other than to 
slightly weaken the effect of latitude and increase the effect of elevation (albeit still at non-
significant levels); the Europe dummy also increases its statistical significance slightly.  Finally, it 
is important to note that the slavery variable produces a higher R2 as well in both regressions; 
indeed, in univariate regressions the slavery variable explains 27% of the variation in ELF in the 
Fearon dataset and 29% in the Alesina dataset despite the fact that our data only records 61 
countries as having exporting any slaves at all. 
 
3. CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
 
3.1. Post-Colonial Origins 
 
So far we have examined the potential effects of historical variables on African ethnic 
diversity.  Here we turn towards more contemporary variables, in particular suggestions from many 
scholars that modern political and socio-economic development can alter ethnic diversity.  For 
instance, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) have suggested that ethnic heterogeneity leads to poorer 
public goods provision due to diverse preferences, and that as a result citizens from ethnically 
heterogeneous states have the incentive to secede and create new, more ethnically homogenous 
states.  They claim that these incentives would be enhanced as countries democratize and thus give 
their citizens greater latitude to choose their own future.  Yet there is very little evidence supporting 
this theory in post-colonial Africa, where there has been a remarkable lack of secessionist 
movements even after democratization swept the continent in the 1990s (Englebert 2009). 
There is more evidence behind two other processes in the post-colonial period, namely 
nation-building and urbanization.  As regards the former, modernization theorists like Gellner (2006 
[1983]) argued that political and economic development would produce more homogenous 
societies, both because ethnic divisions of labour would lead to secession and the creation of more 
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homogenous states and because industrialization required states to create largely homogenous 
workforces which could easily communicate with each other.  Indeed, most African governments in 
the 1960s and 1970s attempted to create common national identities that transcended ethnicity, 
following Mozambiquean President Samora Machel’s dictum that, “for the nation to live, the tribe 
must die” (Mamdani 1996, 135).  Thus Botswana’s success in promoting both economic growth 
and political stability has led some authors like Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003, 106) to 
suggest that its unusually high ethnic homogeneity is “more an outcome of Botswana’s political 
institutions than an independent cause.” 
A second theorized explanation for ethnic change is urbanization.  Social theorists from 
Marx and Engels to Gellner (2006 [1983]) have invoked urbanization as a key variable in the 
transition from old multi-ethnic agrarian societies to modern nation-states, while historians like 
Weber (1976) have shown how urbanization spread nationalist ideology and homogenization in 
France and other western countries in the 19th and 20th centuries.  In particular urbanization has 
been seen as both the mechanism by which people from different but related ethnic groups come in 
contact with each other, realize their commonalities and form new and broader ethnic identities, and 
the means by which the state can enforce nationalist ideology through education and propaganda.  
Rural citizens, on the other hand, remain isolated from each other physically and socially, and 
modern nation-states have often had difficulties reaching out to their rural peripheries.  Within 
Africa perhaps the best example of the effects of urbanization on ethnic diversity phenomenon is 
Botswana, which had a 7.1% annual rate of urbanization between 1960 and 2000, or the highest of 
any country in the world.15  The result of such a large-scale shift was the creation of neutral ethnic 
spaces which “provided an enabling context for minorities to join and partially ‘assimilate’ to 
national life” (Solway 2004, 132). 
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 The only other country which had an urbanization rate above 5% over this period was 
Mozambique (5.3%) (United Nations 2008). 
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In Africa the relative lack of urbanization could be one reason behind the continent’s high 
ethnic diversity.  Indeed, colonial rulers deliberately suppressed urbanization until the mid-
twentieth century, partially due to the need to utilize labor in rural areas but also because they were 
worried about the existence of an urban “detribalized” proletariat as a fertile recruiting tool for 
nationalist anti-colonial movements (Mamdani 1996, 102).  Many of these policies persisted into 
the post-colonial era, as most African governments solved urban housing shortages by taking up 
“systematic round-ups and expulsions of urban dwellers living in self-constructed shacks” (Freund 
2007, 148).  Governments often targeted the urban unemployed or underemployed, who were then 
redeployed to rural areas in a direct continuation of colonial policy (albeit with “greater zeal”) 
(Brennan 2006, 403).  The result has been that, as demonstrated in Table 4, Africa remains the 
continent with the lowest level of urbanization, and is projected to become a majority urban region 
only after 2030. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Yet, despite state efforts to suppress urbanization, the dual effects of colonial pacification 
and economic development programs have encouraged urbanization indirectly via high population 
growth, local land scarcities and out-migration from tribal areas.  While some of these migrants 
moved to rural areas, many of them moved to cities, where they formed new ethnic identities.  
Indeed, as noted by Freund (2007, 90-91) and Wallerstein (1960, 133), Africans have often 
assimilated into larger ethnic groups in order to find security and prestige in the difficult urban 
environment.  The Ibo of Nigeria, the Jola of Senegal, Duala of Cameroon and Bangala of the DRC 
can thus be seen as classic examples of previously different ethnic groups amalgamating into larger 
ethnic identities as urban migrants found commonalties among each other and transferred these new 
identities back to their rural brethren as well (Eckert 1999; Nugent 2008; Young 1976). 
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3.2. Empirical Analysis 
 
In order to see if nation-building and urbanization have had any effect in promoting ethnic 
homogenization within Africa we could regress ethnic diversity onto a variety of variables as in 
Table 2, but any correlation between the post-colonial variables and ethnic diversity would not, of 
course, tell us anything about causality.  Moreover, inasmuch as different countries measure 
urbanization according to vastly different definitions any such static correlation across countries is 
bound to be inaccurate.16  Thus regressing change over time in levels of ethnic diversity on changes 
in nation-building and urbanization in long-difference model would allow us better insight into 
causal effects, and would also allow us to control for different definitions for urbanization and other 
variables like international migration.  Theoretically one way to do this would be to use measures of 
ethnic diversity from different country census reports; yet this exercise is not feasible here as most 
African countries no longer ask questions about ethnicity on their censuses in large part because of 
the controversies surrounding ethnic headcounts (Morning 2008).  There is, however, one extant 
source of changes in ethnic fractionalization over time, namely Roeder (2001)’s data on ethnic 
diversity in 1961 and 1985 as drawn from Soviet ethnographic sources. 
As regards the independent variables we can measure annual rates of urbanization between 
1950 and 1975 in order to allow for a 10-year lag.17  We can proxy for the role of nation-building in 
several ways.  We proxy for economic nation-building through the net change in the percentage of 
citizens recorded as illiterate between 1950 and 1975, economic growth per capita between 1960 
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 Current thresholds for the classification of urban areas in Africa range from agglomerations of 
1500 people in Equatorial Guinea to 10,000 in Senegal.  Changes in definitions of urbanization do 
take place over time within countries but these changes are still dwarfed by the cross-country 
differences. 
17
 We cannot create more than a 10-year lag as the UN data on urbanization only goes back to 1950.  
The results do not differ if we instead use a 5-year lag. 
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and 1985 and annual growth in agricultural productivity between 1961 and 1985.  We can also 
proxy for political nation building by measuring the cumulative change in each country’s Polity IV 
measure between 1960 and 1985.  (Lagging the data for economic growth, agricultural productivity 
or Polity IV does not leave us with enough observations.) 
We present our results in Table 5.  In column 1 we regress change in ELF on urbanization 
between 1950 and 1975 while controlling for the initial 1961 ethnic diversity scores from Roeder 
(2001) to account for a convergence effect.  In column 2 we add GDP/capita growth and change in 
Polity IV between 1960 and 1985.  In column 3 we control for annual change in fertility and 
mortality alongside net migration inasmuch as changes in the population composition should have 
an effect on a given society’s ethnic demographics.  Finally, in column 4 we control for changes in 
illiteracy and agricultural productivity, both because the two variables are measures of nation-
building but also because it is argued elsewhere that they should correlate with urbanization (Dyson 
2001; Yuki 2007). 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The results are clear: in all four regressions the coefficient for urbanization is both 
statistically significant and consistently located between -0.84 and -1.15, suggesting that higher 
rates of urbanization is correlated with ethnic homogenization within Africa.  None of the other 
variables are statistically significant at the 5% level except migration, whose negative value 
surprisingly suggests that immigration is correlated with lowered levels of ethnic diversity rather 
than the higher levels experienced among highly urbanized countries elsewhere (Green 2011). 
We can also estimate the effects of urbanization on ethnic diversity over time.  More 
specifically, if we use the mean coefficient of -0.945 from Table 5, the urbanization rate of 2.7% 
between 1950 and 1975 for the whole of Africa should have lowered the continent’s mean level of 
ethnic diversity by 0.026 between 1961 and 1985.  While this amount may seem small – at this rate 
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it would take Africa over two hundred years to drop from its current mean level of 0.71 to the 
current global mean of 0.48 as measured by Fearon (2003), and even longer if urbanization rates 
continue to drop as predicted – this result nonetheless adds further evidence that African ethnic 
diversity is indeed dynamic and endogenous to social phenomena. 
 
4. INTERPRETATION 
 
Our results thus suggest that latitude, slave exports, state size and urbanization play a strong 
causal role in African ethnic diversity, and that other hypothesized causes have little to no 
significant effect.  Indeed, while at first the negative results for the other hypothesized variables are 
counterintuitive, a closer look at the evidence suggests otherwise.  As regards the pre-colonial 
variables, previous scholars have found contradictory evidence: Nettle (1996), for instance, finds no 
relationship between diversity and elevation in West Africa, while many of studies mentioned 
above only examine bivariate correlations and therefore fail to check if any variables lose 
significance and/or coefficient size in multivariate regressions.  The significance of latitude here, 
however, merely confirms previous findings from Ahlerup and Olsson (2009) and Michalopoulos 
(2008). 
As for the colonial period, there is a good amount of equivocal evidence about the impact of 
both arbitrary borders and indirect rule on ethnic diversity.  For instance, despite their lack of 
detailed ethnographic knowledge European colonialists often tried to avoid splitting indigenous 
states between colonies when they could: the Angola/Zambia, Benin/Nigeria, Ghana/Burkina Faso, 
Niger/Nigeria, and Rwanda/Tanganyika borders, among others, were all drawn to ensure that pre-
colonial African states were not partitioned.  Indeed, the British Prime Minster Lord Salisbury 
pushed for the Ndian river to be demarcated as the border between Nigeria and Kamerun in 1887 as 
it marked “a distinct ethnographic frontier” between Bantu and non-Bantu peoples (Partridge and 
Gillard 1995, 251).  After the partition of the German colonial empire in 1919 the then British 
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Colonial Secretary was similarly concerned about the initial French/British border in the Cameroons 
as it “cut across tribal and administrative divisions,” and was pleased at the addition of the British 
Cameroons and Togoland to the Empire as it brought “completely within our borders native Tribes 
which have hitherto been partly within British territory and partly outside it” (Louis 1966, 885-886).  
Finally, there is evidence as well of European powers allowing for the transfer of populations 
caught on the wrong side of the borders between Gambia and Senegal, the Belgian Congo and 
Uganda, and Kenya and Italian Somaliland in the early colonial period (Griffiths 1986; Trouval 
1966). 
There is also evidence that European “tribal” policies did not always increase pre-existing 
ethnic diversity.  In many places such as central Uganda colonial policies had little effect on ethnic 
identities due to the strength of pre-colonial attachments (Green 2008).  In other areas ethnic groups 
that were too small to be formed into individual chiefdoms or kingdoms were consolidated into 
larger groupings and given chiefs with “invented traditions” (Ranger 1983); in this way the 
Abaluhya of Kenya and Ndebele of Zimbabwe, among many others, were grouped together in a 
single district and eventually became single ethnic groups (Mamdani 1996, 81-82; Ndegwa 1997).  
It was not only the colonial state which promoted ethnic homogeneity through cost-saving: 
missionaries often “reduced Africa’s innumerable dialects to fewer written languages” and thereby 
promoted ethnic homogeneity in large part due to budgetary constraints (Iliffe 2007, 239; Posner 
2003). 
In the post-colonial period most African states have done very little to promote nation-
building and ethnic homogenization, focusing instead on superficial policies alongside the 
promotion of deep ethnic divisions that contributed to political instability and civil wars.  While rare 
cases of political stability such as Tanzania have often seen a decreased salience of ethnic diversity, 
there is little concomitant evidence of ethnic homogenization (Miguel 2004), while a closer reading 
of post-colonial Botswana suggests that politicians there have actually done little to integrate ethnic 
minorities into a common national identity (Poteete 2009).  Indeed, the most stringent example of 
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nation-building in 20th-century Africa took place in Ethiopia, where efforts at promoting Amharic 
failed to contribute to ethnic homogenization but rather led to ethnic revolts against Emperor Hailie 
Selassie, the secession of Eritrea and the implementation of a system of ethnic federalism after 
1993. 
Finally, the results with urbanization correspond to the results from Robinson (2009)’s 
investigation into patterns of national identification in Africa.  Using third-round Afrobarometer 
survey data from 21,937 respondents across 16 African countries, she found a strong correlation 
between urbanization and the likelihood of feeling more strongly attached to one’s national identity 
than one’s ethnic identity in a series of logistic regressions that included age, gender, education and 
wealth as controls.  We carried out similar logistic regressions with fourth-round Afrobarometer 
data from 25,705 respondents across 19 countries and obtained the same robust effect of 
urbanization on nationalism with a variety of controls (results available from authors).  These 
results thus provide further evidence of a causal effect of urbanization on ethnic homogenization. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have shown that Africa’s unusually high ethnic diversity has four sources, 
namely its tropical location, the early modern slave trade, the creation of large colonial states and 
low levels of urbanization.  We demonstrated that the inclusion of a variable capturing the global 
early modern slave trade in regressions explaining global ethnic diversity makes an Africa dummy 
variable statistically insignificant.  We also showed that these four variables are robust to various 
specifications and that a number of other variables such as indirect rule, artificial borders, economic 
growth and democratization are not robustly correlated with ethnic diversity. 
As such this paper has two broad contributions to the literature on Africa and ethnic 
diversity.  First, this paper suggests that Africa’s ethnic diversity does not have mysterious origins.  
Africa’s unusually high levels of ethnic diversity can be explained by its supply of slaves to the 
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early modern slave trade, and its large standard deviation in ethnic diversity is the result of internal 
variation in latitudinal spread, state size and urbanization.  The relationship between diversity and 
latitude confirms the results found by Ahlerup and Olsson (2009) and Michalopoulos (2008) on a 
global scale, and the significance of state size confirms the role of colonialists in creating ethnically 
diverse states in Africa, albeit not in the divide and rule strategy suggested above.  Indeed, the 
results suggest that the unusual lack of secessionist movements in post-colonial Africa should thus 
not only be seen as partially responsible for the continent’s lack of state formation and 
consolidation but also for its ethnic diversity (Englebert 2009; Herbst 2000).  Finally, the ethnic 
diversity that pervaded rural society in other regions in the pre-modern era has persisted in Africa in 
part because of the continent’s low levels of urbanization. 
Second, it suggests that African ethnic diversity is not primordial or fixed and thus cannot 
continue to be used as an exogenous variable in analyses of African political economy.  Further 
research in this area must continue to interrogate the primordialist assumptions that still plague the 
study of African ethnicity.  Moreover, the results here suggest that measures to alleviate the 
negative effects of ethnic diversity could concentrate less on such suggestions as the creation of 
locally homogenous political units (Laitin 2007) and more on promoting urbanization as a means of 
ethnic homogenization.18 
Additional research on this topic could focus on a number of important items.  First, 
inasmuch as pre-colonial slave exports are significantly correlated with modern ethnic diversity, it 
is important to develop more accurate quantitative measures of pre-colonial slavery which do not 
use ethnicity for identification purposes and which better account for the internal slave trade within 
                                               
18
 The United Nations recently documented in great detail the role of African governments in 
suppressing urbanization.  For instance, in asking governments around the world in 2009 whether 
they wanted to raise, maintain or lower levels of rural-urban migration, 81% of African 
governments wanted to lower migration while 48% wanted to raise urban-rural migration.  In both 
cases these were the highest percentages of any region in the world (United Nations 2010, 66, 70). 
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Africa and Eurasia.  Secondly, more substantial time-series data on ethnic change over time would 
improve our understanding of how political and economic phenomena affect ethnicity in Africa.  
Finally, similar analyses for other parts of the world would add to our knowledge on this subject. 
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Table 1: Ethnic Diversity Across Continents 
(Source: Alesina et al. (2003)) 
 
 Obs Mean Stand Dev Min Max 
Sub-Saharan Africa 46 0.662 0.226 0 0.930  
Asia 42 0.425 0.224 0.002 0.769 
Americas 35 0.420 0.215 0.095 0.864 
Europe 47 0.311 0.214 0.041 0.809 
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Table 2: Historical Sources of African Ethnic Diversity 
 
Dependent Variable Alesina Alesina Alesina Fearon Fearon Fearon 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Ln(Exports/Area) 0.029*** 0.028** 0.027*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Latitude -0.045** -0.041* -0.050** -0.053** -0.047** -0.058*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Km2 0.044** 0.038** 0.047* 0.056*** 0.043*** 0.051** 
 (0.018) (0.016) 0.025 (0.018) (0.014) (0.023) 
British Colony 0.040 0.052 0.037 0.058 0.079 0.054 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.073) 
French Colony 0.038 0.034 0.037 0.014 0.032 -0.002 
 (0.094) (0.079) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080) (0.084) 
Portuguese Colony 0.016 0.040 0.059 0.014 0.045 0.010 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.097) (0.079) (0.086) (0.085) 
Elevation -0.028  -0.029 -0.056  -0.061 
 (0.035)  (0.042) (0.018)  (0.038) 
Temperature  0.010   0.007  
  (0.011)   (0.010) 
Fractal   -0.324   -1.154 
   (1.911)   (1.918) 
Constant 0.244 -0.090 0.243 0.289 -0.074 0.477 
 (0.010) (0.205) (0.451) (0.260) (0.255) (0.378) 
  
N 43 43 40 42 42 39 
 
R2 0.563 0.570 0.578 0.604 0.589 0.619 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3: African and Global Ethnic Diversity 
 
Dependent Variable Alesina Alesina Fearon Fearon 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Elevation 0.003 0.026 0.012 0.034*  
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017)  
Latitude -0.067*** -0.053*** -0.071*** -0.056***  
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021)  
British Colony 0.002 0.023 0.023 0.046  
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.056) (0.053)  
French Colony -0.020 -0.022 -0.036 -0.032  
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.058) (0.053)  
Spanish Colony -0.083 -0.041 -0.094 -0.056  
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.063)  
Km2 0.012 -0.004 0.021 0.008  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)  
Europe Dummy -0.105** -0.123** -0.078 -0.096*  
 (0.053) (0.049) (0.056) (0.054)  
SSAfrica Dummy 0.177*** 0.033 0.200*** 0.071  
 (0.048) (0.058) (0.050) (0.060)  
Ln(Exports/Area)  0.029***  0.025***  
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Constant 0.498 0.520 0.330 0.337  
 (0.175) (0.166) (0.202) (0.187)  
 
N 157 157 148 148 
 
R2 0.389 0.472 0.424 0.486 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Percent Urban by Area 
(Source: United Nations (2008)) 
 
Region 1950 1975 2000 2030 (projected) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.1 21.7 32.8 48.2 
Asia 16.8 24.0 37.1 54.1 
Latin America and Caribbean 42.0 61.2 75.4 84.3 
Europe 50.5 65.6 71.7 78.3 
Oceania 62.0 71.5 70.5 73.8 
North America 63.9 73.8 79.1 86.7 
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Table 5: Changes in Ethnic Identity, 1961-1985 
(Dependent Variable: Change in Roeder (2001), 1961-1985) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Urbanization 1950-1975 -0.838** -0.958** -0.834** -1.149*** 
 (0.381)  (0.361) (0.405) (0.379) 
Roeder ELF (1961) 0.024 -0.0001 0.027 0.012 
 (0.189) (0.053) (0.017) (0.030) 
GDP/capita Growth 1960-1985  0.222 
  (0.497) 
Polity IV 1960-1985  0.003 
  (0.002) 
Fertility 1960-1985   0.233 
   (0.548) 
Net Migration 1960-1985   -0.118*** 
   (0.027) 
Mortality 1960-1985   0.552 
   (0.929) 
Illiteracy 1950-1975    0.622 
    (0.891) 
Agricultural Productivity 1961-1985    -1.099* 
    (0.550) 
Constant 0.004 0.033 0.012 0.019 
 (0.018)  (0.057) (0.021) (0.039) 
 
N 45 18 45 28 
 
R2 0.208 0.347 0.273 0.404 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Alesina: ELF as measured by Alesina et al. (2003). 
 
Fearon: ELF as measured by Fearon (2003). 
 
Roeder: Change in ELF between 1961 and 1985 as measured by Roeder (2001). 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Agricultural Productivity: Annual growth rate in net agricultural production per capita per country, 
1961-1985.  Source: FAO. 
 
Area: Natural log of a country’s area in square kilometers.  Source: Center of International 
Development, Harvard University. 
 
British Colony: Dummy equals 1 if a state was ever colonized by the UK and 0 otherwise. 
 
Elevation: Natural log of a country’s mean latitude.  Source: Center of International Development, 
Harvard University. 
 
Fractal: Natural log of a measure computing the degree by which a given country’s non-coastal 
borders are straight lines, with the measure decreasing as the border approaches a straight line.  
Source: Alesina et al. (2011). 
 
French Colony: Dummy equals 1 if a state was ever colonized by France and 0 otherwise. 
 
GDP/c Growth: GDP/capita growth per country.  Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009). 
 
Latitude: Natural log of a country’s absolute central latitude.  Source: Center of International 
Development, Harvard University. 
 
Net Migration: Average annual rate of net migration per country.  Source: United Nations 
Population Division, World Population Prospects. 
 
Polity IV: Net change over time in a country’s Polity IV rating.  Source: Polity IV. 
 
Portuguese Colony: Dummy equals 1 if a state was initially colonized by Portugal and 0 otherwise. 
 
Spanish Colony: Dummy equals 1 if a state was initially colonized by Spain and 0 otherwise. 
 
Slave Exports: Natural log of the total number of slaves exported from a given state between 1400 
and 1900, divided by the area of the state and multiplied by 1000.  Source: Nunn (2008). 
 
Temperature: The natural log of the average mean temperature per country, 1961-1990.  Source: 
Mitchell, Carter, Jones, Hulme, and New (2004). 
 
Urbanization: Average annual growth rate in the percentage of residents living in cities.  Source: 
United Nations (2008). 
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Appendix 2: Estimates of Slave Exports Outside Africa 
 
Region  Slave Exports Ln(Exports/Area) Source 
 
Afghanistan 150,000? 5.445 Levi (2002, 284) 
 
Iran  350,000 5.358 Hopkins (2008, 645) 
 
South-East Asia 300,000  Seijas (2008, 23)  
    Warren (2007, xxxv) 
 Indonesia  4.820 
 Malaysia  4.820 
 Philipppines  4.820 
 
Eastern Europe/Russia 2,000,000  Kizilov (2007, 7) 
 Belarus  4.684 
 Estonia  4.684  
 Georgia  4.684 
 Latvia  4.684 
 Lithuania  4.684 
 Moldova  4.684 
 Poland  4.684 
 Russia  4.684 
 Ukraine  4.684 
 
India/Pakistan 330,000 4.392 
 Central Asia 300,000?  Levi (2002, 283-284) 
 Indian Ocean 30,000  Carter (2006, 805) 
 
Bangladesh/Myanmar 5726 1.938 Vink (2003, 141) 
 
 
 
